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Constitutional Interpretation
and Activist Fantasies
BY RAOUL BERGER*
The great tragedy of Science-the
slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an
ugly fact.
Thomas H. Huxley'
INTRODUCTON
Activist "scholarship" increasingly is divorced from historical fact. A
leading activist theorist, Paul Brest, pleaded with his fellows "simply to
acknowledge that most of our writings are not political theory but
advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the
Court to adopt our various notions for the public good."2 "Advocacy
scholarship" is a contradiction in terms; scholarship is disinterested,
propaganda is not These reflections are stirred by recent articles by
Professors Erwin Chemerinsky' and David A. . Richards.-
* BA 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University, LLM.
1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, University of Cincinnati; LL.D. 1978, University
of Michigan; LL.D. 1988, Northwestern University.
1 OxFoRD DIcrIoNARY OF Q0otATioNs 269 (3d ed. 1979).
2 Paul Brest, The Fwudamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063, 1109 (1981).
3 See infra note 226 (quoting LeaMed Hand).
4 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Sqreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LOY. LA L. REV. 1143 (1992).
- David A. .L Richards, Abolitionist Policy and Constitutional Theory and the
Reconstruction Congress, 25 LoY. LA L. REV. 1187 (1992).
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I. ERWIN CHEMERNSKY
Chemerinsky unabashedly engages in "advocacy scholarship." He
applauds the "constitutional changes" wrought by the modem Court,6 but
deplores its many "wrong turns and missed opportunities. .. ." and
urges it to carry out the "promise" of the Fourteenth Amendment.' He
opens with the Privileges or Immunities Clause. One may agree that the
Slaughter-House Cases9 unduly restricted the clause to "privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.""0 which may indeed be
regarded as meager in scope." The evidence is that the Framers meant
" Chemerinsky, suqra note 4, at 1143. Yet, Justice Harlan declared that the Court's
reapportionment interpretations were '!made in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered
history to the contrary." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that State representation in the
House shall be cut in proportion to disfranchisement on racial grounds. Senator Jacob
Howard explained: "[Jhe theory of this whole Amendment is, to leave the power of
regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and not to assume
to regulate it by any clause of the Constitution. .. ." ALFvR AVINS, THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS' DEBATSS 237 (1967). The Report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, which drafted the Amendment, stated,
"It was doubtful... whether the States would consent to surrender a power
-they had always exercised, and to which they were attached ... [and therefore
commended Section 2 because it] .... would leave the whole question with the
people of each State."
Id. at 94. The one man-one vote decisions therefore represent a blatant reversal of the
framers' will For additional citations, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOuRTEENTH AMENDMENT 64-68 (1977) (discussing the
intent to leave suffrage under state control).
7 Lawrence B. Solum, Foreword- History, Fable and Constitutional Interpretation,
25 LoY. LA. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1992).
s Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1144.
9 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 36 (1872).
'0 Id. at 78, 79.
1 Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1146. Chemerinsky considers that Slaughter-House
"ruled in favor of... wealthy economic interests." Id. at 1155 (citations omitted). Why
then did Justice Field, who had ties to great railroad interests, dissent?
Justice Miller was hardly to be blamed, because there was some confusion among
the framers. Originally "privileges and immunities," derived from Article IV, referred to
rights a citizen of one State might enjoy in another. See infra notes 16-24 and
accompanying text Senator Howard dwelt on "privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States." AviNs, .upra note 6, at 219. The confusion was compounded by John
Bingham, who stated:
The amendment [in earlier draft] is exactly in the language of the Constitution
[i.e. Article IV]; that is to say, it secures to the citizens of each of the States all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several Sates .... It is to
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to protect some privileges and immunities of State citizens derived from
Article IV and limited to trade and commerce," not, however, the all
but boundless cornucopia envisioned by activists. For that broad view,
Chemerinsky relies on a statement in Corfield v. Coryell 3 that was
quoted by Senator Jacob Howard in the thirty-ninth Congress,14 and on
Bruce Ackerman's "powerful criticism of Berger's historical account."'5
This criticism, more splenetic than "powerful," shatters on the historical
facts.
A. Privileges or Immunities
The words "privileges and immunities" first appear in Article IV of
the Articles of Confederation, which specified "all the privileges of trade
and commerce."' 6 The words were adopted in Article IV of the Consti-
tution which, according to Chief Justice White, was intended "to
perpetuate [the] limitations" of the earlier Article IV.7 White repeated
Justice Miller's statement from the Slaughter-House Cases that "[t]here
can be little question that... the privileges and immunities intended are
the same in each.'
"Privileges or immunities" came into the Fourteenth Amendment by
way of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, which referred to "civil rights or
immunities."'9 In explaining those terms, Senator Lyman Trumbull,
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, not only read from Corfield
v. Coryell,0 but also from the Maryland (per Samuel Chase, soon to be
secure to the citizen of each State all the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States in the several States.
Id. at 160 (emphasis added). Article IV provided for enjoyment of certain privileges of
the host State, not an alloy of "all the privileges of citizens of the several States."
12 See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
13 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). Chemerinsky, supra note 4,
at 1145 (quoting Coifed, 6 F. Cas. at 551).
14 Id. at 1145.
" Id. at 1146 n.7. Ackerman seized upon an ellipsis in one of thousands of
quotations, to which he attributed sinister "concealment:' That canard was exploded by
my subsequent publication of the entire quotation. Such was the sum and substance of
Ackerman's "powerful attack." In a forthcoming article in the Brigham Young University
Law Review, Raoul Berger, Bruce Ackernan on Interpretation. A Citique, 1992 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1035. I pay my respects to Ackerman's "scholarship."
16 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (Henry S. Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963).
'7 United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920) (emphasis added).
n Id. at 296.
"AVINS, supra note 6, at 104.
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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elevated to the Supreme Court) and Massachusetts (per Chief Justice
Parker) cases. 21 Early on, the Maryland and Massachusetts courts had
construed Article IV in terms of trade and commerce.' Chase declared,
as did Parker, that the words were to be given a "limited operation."
Activists ignore the Maryland and Massachusetts cases and build entirely
on Corfield2 Trumbull, however, did not read Corfield broadly, stating
that it "enumerates the very rights'  set forth in the Bill and explaining
that "the great fundamental rights set forth!'26 in the Bill are "the right
to acquire property, the rights to go and come at pleasure, the right to
enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose
of property."27
Chemerinsky would attribute to the 1823 Corfield case the power to
expand the 1866 Bill whose spokesman, after quoting from Corfield, said
enumerated the "very rights" listed in the Bill, rights that Georgia v.
Rachel 8 described as "a limited category of rights." In his Slaughter-
House dissent, Justice Field noted the derivation of privileges or
immunities from Article IV and stated that "Congress has given its
interpretation of those terms in the Civil Rights Act."'  Neither
Ackerman nor Chemerinsky allude to the foregoing facts. Serious
scholarship requires cognizance of such discrepant evidence.
A word as to Senator Howard's remarks-Due to the sudden illness of
Chairman Fessenden, it fell to Howard to act as spokesman for the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction. Howard stated: "I can only promise to
present to the Senate ... the views and motives which influenced that
21 AVINS, supra note 6, at 121, 122.
" Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Abbott v. Bayley, 23
Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91 (1827).
Campbell, 3 H. & McH. at 554; Abbott, 23 Mass. (6 Pick) at 91.
The court in Corfield stated. "[Wle cannot accede to the proposition ... that...
the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong
exclusively to the citizens of any other particular state .. " Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552
(emphasis added).
" AVINS, supra note 6, at 122 (emphasis added).
" Id. (emphasis added).
2' Id. In the House, Rep. Shallabarger quoted Chancellor Kent's reading of Corfield:
"[Fundamental rights] are the rights of protection of life, liberty, and to acquire and enjoy
property, and to pay no higher imposition than other citizens, and to pass through or
reside in the State at pleasure, and to enjoy the elective franchise. ... " Id. at 248. After
reading from Corfield, Senator Trumbull immediately emphasized that the Civil Rights
Bill did not provide for suffrage. Id. at 122.
" 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
2Id. at 791.
30 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96-97 (1872).
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committee, so far as I understand those views and motives ... ;
According to Benjamin Kendrick, editor of the Journal of the Committee,
Howard was "one of the most ... reckless of the radicals.." who had
"served consistently in the vanguard of the extreme Negrophiles. '33 In this
he was far removed from the conservative and moderate Republicans who
prevailede Leonard Levy, who views the Court revisory efforts
sympathetically, stated that "there is no reason to believe that Bingham and
Howard expressed the views of the majority of Congress. 35
A telling illustration of the "limited" scope of "privileges or immunities"
was furnished by John Bingham, an activist mainstay. Despite repeated
assurances that the Civil Rights Bill was limited to the specifically
enumerated rights, Bingham vehemently protested:
[C]ivil Rights ... include and embrace every right that pertains to the citizen
.... [it would] strike down ... every State constitution which makes a
discrimination on account of rae or color in any of the civil rights of the
citizen .... [it would] refom the whole civil and criminal code of every
State government.
Consequently, as James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
explained, the phrase "civil rights and immunities" was deleted in order to
remove "the difficulty growing out of any other construction beyond the
specific rights named in the section, ... leav[ing] the bill with the rights
specified in the section: '  The House approved the deletion of the
"oppressive" words. No activist has attempted to explain why Bingham, after
strenuously protesting against the oppressive invasion by "civil rights" of the
States' domain, embraced in the lesser "privileges" of the Amendment the
very over-broad regime he had rejected in the Bill. In truth, the framers
regarded "privileges or immunities" as words of art having a circumscribed
meaning. After reading to the Senate from the cases, Trumbull remarked:
"[his being the construction as settled by judicial decisions... ?'" And
3' AVINS, supra note 6, at 218-19.
2 BENYAMI KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMnrTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 192 (1914).
33 Id.
' See infra text accompanying notes 174-175.
31 LEONARD LEVY, JuomENai: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 77 (1972).
' AVINS, supra note 6, at 186, 188 (emphasis added); Justice Black understood
Bingham to object because the Bill "would actually strip the States of power to govern."
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 100 (1947).
3 AVINS, supra note 6, at 191 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 122.
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Judge William Lawrence acknowledged in the House "that the courts
have by construction limited the words 'aliprivileges' to mean only 'some
privileges.""'3 Although the Supreme Court noticed this Bingham
incident in Georgia v. Rachel,40 it is ignored by activists.
That is likewise the fate of other striking evidence. On January 20,
1871, Bingham submitted a Report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, from which he did not dissent, reciting that the
[Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] does
not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges and immunities
... other than those privileges and immunities embraced in the original
text of the Constitution, article 4, section 2. The fourteenth amendment,
it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities before
mentioned... 41
The Supreme Court likewise declared that the clause did not add to those
privileges or immunities provided by Article IV!2 What manner of
scholarship is it that ignores such weighty evidence?
B. State Action Required
A "second major error," Chemerinsky asserts, was the Court's
restriction of the Fourteenth Amendment "to government action."
41
Noting that the amendment "prohibits a 'state' from denying equal
'9 Id. at 207 (emphasis added). In a similar case the Supreme Court stated: "[W]e
should not assume that Congress ... used the words ... in their ordinary dictionary
meaning when they had already been construed as terms of art carrying a special and
limited connotation." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957). Walter Murphy,
a critic of my views, concedes that "privileges or immunities" had "become words of art"
as Berger "amply demonstrates." Walter Murphy, Book Rewew, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1758-
59 (1978).
4' 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
41 AVINS, supra note 6, at 466 (emphasis added). This was made plain by
Shellabarger in the thirty-ninth Congress: The Civil Rights Bill "neither confers nor
defines nor regulates any right whatever. Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate
rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed
by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike. . ." Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
Speaking to privileges or immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hotchkiss said that
it "is precisely like the present Constitution; it confers no additional powers." Id. at 160.
So too, James Wilson stated: "We are establishing no new right .... It is not the object
of this bill to establish new rights .. .. "Id. at 163.
42 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 596 (1900).
43 Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1147.
[Vol 82
FouRTEENmh AMENDMENT
protection ... ,"' he argues that "states might deny equality . . . byinaction in the face of private wrongs."'45 Yet, "deny" is defined in terms
of positive action, so it is equally arguable that the framers contemplated
action by the State. That was plainly what the framers of the antecedent
Civil Rights Act had in mind. When Representative Loan asked why the
Bill is limited "to those who act under color of law," James Wilson
replied, "We are not making a general criminal code for the States."
Shellabarger explained that "the violations of citizens' rights, which are
reached and punished by this bill, are those that are inflicted under 'color
of law' .... The bill does not reach mere private wrongs, but only those
done under color of State authority ... ."' Senator Trumbull also
indicated that the bill was aimed at officials acting under color of
law," and Judge Lawrence said that it applied "if an officer shall
intentionally deprive a citizen of a right."'49 Raymond spoke to the same
effect.'
The Civil Rights Act is immediately relevant because the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to incorporate the Act into the Constitution so
as to remove doubts as to its constitutionality and to place it beyond the
power of a subsequent Congress to repeal. ' An ardent advocate of an
abolitionist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, Howard Jay Graham,
stated that "virtually every speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth
Aimendments-Republicans and Democrats alike-said, or agreed that the
Amendment was designed to embody, or incorporate the Civil Rights
Act."' Were the "identity" less clear, laws in pari materia, dealing with
the same subject matter, must be construed with reference to each
other." If any debater maintained that the Amendment applied to private
wrongs, it escaped my attention. With good reason, therefore, has the rule
44Id.
43 Id.
4' AVINS, supra note 6, at 165.
47 Id. at 189.
4, Id. at 198.
49 Id. at 209.
'0 Id. at 215.
" See RAOUL BERGEP, GOvR ENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMNMENT 23 & n.12 (1977).
n HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EvYMANI's CONSTITUTION 291 n.73 (1968). For instance,
George Latham stated that the Act "covers exactly the same ground as this Amendment"
AviNs, supra note 6, at 223. See also HoRAcE E. FACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 81 (1908) ("nearly all said that [the Fourteenth Amendment]
was but an inoqxation of the Civil Rights Bill").
"See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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that the Amendment "applies almost exclusively to government actions"
remained firmY It is Chemerinsky, not the Court, that is in error.
C. Separate but Equal
Chemerinsky regards Plessy v. Ferguson55 as "the greatest trage-
dy" in the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
cost of which "in untapped human potential is incalculable."' In view
of current activist infatuation with literary parallels, it may be recalled
that Gustave Flaubert considered that "personal sympathy, genuine
emotion, twitching nerves and tear-filled eyes only impair the sharpness
of the artist's vision."' Even more, the historian said C. Vann Wood-
ward, '%as a special obligation to sobriety and fidelity to the record." 9
It will not do to test the aims of the framers by Chemerinsky's
emotions. Racism, it needs to be borne in mind, "ran deep in the
North," 0 and "the suggestion that Negroes should be treated as equal to
white men woke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the American
mind."' Republicans took account of race prejudice as an inescapable
fact: Julian referred to the "proverbial hatred" of Negroes;' Senator
Lane referred to the "almost ineradicable prejudice;' ' 3 and Wilson
5 Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1148.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1148,
57Id.
' ARNOLD HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART 76 (1982).
'9 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF SOUTHErN HISTORY 87 (1960). "To get
at its truth [of our system of morality], it is useful to omit the emotion and ask ourselves
what those generalizations are and how far they are confirmed by fact accurately
ascertained." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1920). The black
historian, John Hope Franklin, observed that 'historical work, with its established
standards for evaluation of evidence, must not be 'polluted by passion'; we must not
simply turn the past into a minor of our own present-day concerns." Drew Faust,
Unpolluted by Passion, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1990, § 7, at 13 (book review). Frederick M.
Grimm praised David Hume because his "writing of history ... [was] exempt from
prejudice and from passion." 2 HISTORIANS AT WORK 225 (Peter Gay & Victor Wexler
eds., 1972) (quoting Frederick Melchior Grimm in his Correspondence litt6raire in March,
1793). Finally, Diderot endorsed the view: "Fear the deluded man of good will; he is on
good terms with his own conscience, he desires the good, and everyone trusts him ....
But unfortunately he is mistaken as to the means of procuring it for us." P-.NA
FURBANK, DIDEROT 321 (1992).
"DAvID DONALD, CHARLS SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 202 (1970).
61 Id. at 157.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1865-66).
Id. at 739.
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referred to the "iron-cased prejudice" against blacks." Separate but
equal was rooted in a harsh reality, noted by Alexander Bickel: "It was
preposterous to worry about unsegregated schools ... when hardly a
beginning had been made at educating Negroes at all and when obviously
special efforts suitable only for Negroes, would have to be made." 5
In fact, Pesy merely reiterated what a series of courts had been
holding for fifty years, beginning with the oft-cited decision of Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts v. City of Boston." When the Four-
teenth Amendment was invoked in 1871, the Ohio court in State ex rel.
Gaines v. McCann declared that "equality of rights does not involve the
necessity of educating white and colored persons in the same schooL" '
Other cases followed in Nevada," California,69  and Indiana.7  In
1878, a federal circuit court held that separate schools for blacks did not
constitute a denial of "equal protection,"'' as did the New York court
in 1883.' Thus, Pessy had behind it a row of precedents which rested
solidly on the framers' exclusion of.segregation from the Amendment.
On the "prior concrete historical understanding," states activist David
Richards, "Plessy would be right:'" In explaining the Civil Rights Bill
to the House; Wilson stated that it did not require that all "children shall
attend the same schools."74  Congress "ha[d] permitted segregated
schools in the District of Columbia from 1864 onward, ' and Senator
Charles Sumner vainly fought "to abolish Negro segregated schools in the
District of Columbia."'7 A congress which refused to abolish segregation
in its own bailiwick was hardly likely to insist on abolition by the states.
There is yet other evidence that desegregation was not intended by the
Fourteenth Amendment,' and these findings have been widely accept-
"Id. at 2948.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTic 654 (1976).
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
,State ex rel. Gaines v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871).
State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 348 (1872).
"Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
7, Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 359 (1874).
1 Bertonnequ v. Board of Directors of City Schools, 3 F. Cas. 294 (C.C.D. La. 1878)
(No. 1,361).
7' People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 449 (1883).
73 Richards, supra note 5, at 1188.
74 AvINs, supra note 6, at 163.
7' KLUGER, supra note 65, at 635.
76 Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered" The Segregation
Question, 54 MIcH. L. REV. 1049, 1085 (1956).
77 BERGER, supra note 51, at 117-33.
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ed 8 Not that I would uphold segregation, but a historian's duty is to
face up to the facts unflinchingly.79 Chemerinsky's aspirations may
justify a sociological reappraisal, but they may not alter the limited aims
of the framers. Even his fellow activist Richards recognizes that most
Republicans did not regard segregation "as inconsistent with equal
protection."'" For centuries the rule has been that an Act is to be
construed in light of the "mischief' it was designed to remedy. ' By the
Black Codes the South, in the words of Senator Henry Wilson, sought "to
make slaves of men whom we have made free."83 Senator William
Stewart stated that the Civil Rights Bill was meant to prevent such
"peonage .... It strikes at that; nothing else... That is the whole scope
of the law.""
The Civil Rights Bill, it will be recalled, was limited to discrimina-
tion respecting enumerated, specific rights: the right to own property, to
contract, and to have access to the courts.' Without dissent the framers
regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as identical with the Bill.'
Throughout, the framers associated "equal protection" with the limited
rights that the Bill enumerated. Thus, Shellabarger said, "[W]hatever
rights as to each of the enumerated civil (not political) matters the States
may confer upon one race... shall be held by all races in equality ....
It secures ... equality of protection in those enumerated civil
rights.... ."' The Amendment rephrased the Bill's negative prohibition
of discrimination by positive equal protection. If two acts are in pai
, See Raoul Berger, Activist Censures ofRobert Borlk 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 993, 1014
& n.180 (1991). The Equal Protection Clause "almost certainly was not intended to
disallow racial segregation in schools." Lino A. Graglia, "Interprefing" the Constitutiorn
Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1992).
7Although the great mathematician and astronomer Johannes Kepler indulged in
fantastic speculations, he "was always stubbornly faithful to the facts. His anguish at
finding some wild and beautiful idea was not confirmed by observation was ...
sometimes very considerable, but he never hesitated to abandon it." J.W.N. SULLIVAN,
THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE 131 (1949).
80 See SToRY, infra note 122 and accompanying text.
s Richards, supra note 5, at 1188.
8 Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Pights as
a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 943 (1965).
AVINS, supra note 6, at 138.
Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
"See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
S, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
"AVINS, supra note 6, at 188 (emphasis added). The enumerated rights, said
Shellabarger, are '!necessary as means to the constitutional end, to wit, the protection of
the rights of person and property of a citizen" Id.
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materia, "it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and
a special meaning were given it in the first act, that it was intended it
should receive the same interpretation in the latter act."' Leonard Myers
commented that the Amendment requires each State to provide for "equal
protection to life, liberty, and property, equal right to sue and be sued, to
inherit, make contracts, and give testimony," ' thus identifying the
Amendment with the Bill.
That equal protection did not mean equality in all things is evidenced
by the exclusion of suffrage from the Amendment" and the repeated
rejection of proposals to bar all discrimination." In sum, as Henry
Monaghan observed, the majority of Americans of that period "could
logically believe that emancipation required that the freed man possess
certain rights to personal security and property. Simultaneously, they
could favor rank discrimination against blacks in political and social
matters."' One may sympathize with Chemerinsky's repudiation of such
"rank discrimination"-as I do-and still insist that rejection of the
Framers' choices in favor of our own requires an amendment, for which
judicial revision of the Constitution is no substitute.
Chemerinsky would have the Court "act as a tremendously positive
vehicle for social change, as in Brown v. Board of Education." 93 That
is not its function Under the Constitution social change was confided
to the legislature. Cognizant of the separation of powers, Chief Justice
" Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 162, 165 (1872); United States v. Freeman,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564-65 (1845). In Yates the Court stated "we should not assume
that Congress ... used the words.. . in their ordinary dictionary meaning when they had
already been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation". Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
89 AVINS, supra note 6, at 193.
9* See supra note 6.
91 BERGER, supra note 51, at 163-64.
'2 Henry Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HAIRV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
117, 126 (1978).
"Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1155.
Francis Bacon counselled judges "to remember that their office is jus dcere not
jus dare, to interpret the law, and not to make law, or give law." HENRY S. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 327 (1953). John Dickinson stated at the Convention that "the Judges must
interpret the Laws, they ought not to be legislators." 1 MAX FARKAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDEgAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 108 (1911). Justice Wilson, a leading participant in
the Convention, cautioned in his 1791 lectures that the judge "will remember, that his
duty and his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it." 2 THE
WoRKs OF JAMES WLSON 502 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162, 178 (1875): 'Our province is to decide what the law is, not to
declare what it should be." Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 41 (1849).
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Marshall declared that "[tihe difference between the departments
undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the
judiciary constre the law.""5 Interpretation does not authorize revision;
construction of the Constitution, Marshall wrote, "cannot be the assertion
of a right to change that instrument."'96 Judicial law making also
subverts the federal allocation of powers whereunder the States are to be
shielded from federal exercise of ungranted power, as the Tenth
Amendment hammered home. Speaking on behalf of the Court, Justice
Brandeis emphasized that the Constitution "preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States-independence in their legislative and
independence in their judicial departments" '  and that federal
supervision of their action "is in no case permissible except as to matters
by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United
States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an
invasion of the authority of the State and to that extent, a denial of its
independence."
It remains to be said that social change by judicial fiat has its
shortcomings. Commenting on Lochner v. New York," Chemerinsky
remarks that "[in human terms, countess people were hurt-many were
maimed or died-because for decades the government was denied the
ability to adopt protective laws."'' So too, he notes that "segregated
schools remain in most. American cities,""'° in large part because of the
"white flight" from the cities, with its attendant social costs. And racism,
in fact, has been exacerbated by busing and "affirmative action.'
03
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) (emphasis added).
JoHN MARsiiALL's DBFBNSB oF MCCuL.wUCH v. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.,
1969); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
' 'Those powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X
"Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a more extensive discussion of
this view, see RAouL BEGER, FEDERAUSM: THE FouNDERs' DESIGN (1987).
9Erie R Co., 304 U.S. at 79.
"0 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
o Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1150.
"2 Id. at 1149.
"' Tom Wicker, a liberal columist, stated, "[t]he attitudes between the races, the fear
and animosity that exist today, are greater than, let us say, at the time of the Brown case,
the famous school desegregation decision in 1954. . . . [M]y own feeling is that racial
animosities and fears in New York City are far greater than anything I ever knew growing
up in the segregated South." Opinions Considered- A Talk with Tom Wliker, N.Y. TIMES,
January 5, 1992, § 4, at 4.
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D. The Due Process Clause
Chemerinsky posits that "the Due Process Clause has two different
uses, termed respectively 'substantive' and 'procedural' due process""'
and notes that "substantive" due process was discredited by misapplica-
tion during the Lochner period, "a mistake with very serious consequenc-
es,"'05 which led the Court "to disavow any judicial review of
economic regulations and legislation."'" Apparently he deplores this
"tarring of substantive due process."" °7 In truth, "substantive due
process" was a judicial construct without historical foundation."8 On
the eve of the Convention, Alexander Hamilton stated that "[t]he words
'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to
the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be
referred to as act of the legislature."' "(n History abundantly confirms
that due process applied only to judicial proceedings."0 When the
Framers put due process into the Fifth Amendment, said Charles Curtis,
an ardent proponent of judicial activism, "its meaning was as fixed and
definite as the common law could make a phrase .... It meant a
procedural process, which could be readily ascertained from almost any
law book""' Due process, it has been said, requires fair judicial
procedure, not good statutes.
Due process did not change color when embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court stated in Hurtado v. California"' that the
words were "used in the same sense and with no greater extent" than in
" Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1149.
"' Id. at 1151.
"I !d. at 1150.
1 Id. at 1151.
In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court referred to "our
abandonment of the use of the 'vague contours' of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws
which a majority of the Court believed to be economically unwise .... We refuse to sit
as a 'super legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation."' Id. at 731 (footnotes omitted).
But the Court's abnegation did not extend to supervision of "'civil liberties." Judge
Learned Hand justly stated. "[Tihere is no constitutional basis for asserting a larger
measure ofjudicial supervision over [liberty] than over [property]." LEARNED HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 50, 51 (1958). Instead, both are conjoined in the self-same due process
clause.
19 4 PAPERS OF ALroANDER. HAmILTON 35 (H.C. Syrett & J. E. Cooke eds., 1962)
(emphasis added). For further discussion, see BERGER, slqra note 51, at 193-229.
"' Raoul Berger, Law of the Land Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1979).
. CHARLES P. CURTIS, Review andMajority Rule, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPRME
LAW 170, 177 (Edmond Calm ed., 1954).
o 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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the Fifth Amendment, 3 as the legislative history confirms." 4 When
Chemerinsky asserts that "the Due Process Clause seems to define how
government must act when it deprives people of their rights,." 5 he
expands the clause beyond its historical boundaries. He laments that the
Court's more recent "positivistic approach" has led to "underutilized
procedural due process,""..6 with never a glimmering of the fact that,
according to Justice Story, when the draftsmen employed common law
terms, the common law "definitions are necessarily included, as much as
if they stood in the text of the Act.""7
Chemerinsky is the exemplar par excellence of what his fellow
activist, Paul Brest, described as "advocacy scholarship," writing "amicus
briefs" for a favorite cause."' He brings a "wish list" to constitutional
interpretation and bends the Constitution to fit his goal, on the assumption
that the end justifies the means. When the Court satisfies his wish it is
lauded, when it disappoints him it is tragically mistaken."9 Although
aware that at times the Court has inflicted untold pain, he is ready to
confide in its discretion-provided that it satisfies his desires. Lord
Camden, himself a noted judge, stated: "The discretion of a Judge is the
law of tyrants .... In the best of times it is often-times caprice: in the
worst, it is every vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is
liable."'"0 Justice Story cautioned us to walk a safer path, one that is
true to the very concept of a written Constitution. 2' The Constitution,
"3Id. at 535.
114 BERGER, supra note 51, at 201-08. In the Reconstruction Congress, Judge William
Lawrence quoted Hamilton's definition when discussing the constitutional protections for
property. AviNs, supra note 6, at 479. Another member of that Congress, James Garfield,
defined due process as "an impartial trial according to the laws of the land." Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 111 (1947) (3lack, J., dissenting).
115 Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1152 (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 1153.
"t7 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). "If a statute, makes
use of a word the meaning of which is well known at common law, the words shall be
understood in the same sense it was understood at the common law." 4 MATrEEW
BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 647 (3d ed. 1768).
... See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
1- Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1143.
120 7 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALs 55, note at 57 (1810)
(quoting the case of Hindson v. Kersey).
"21 "The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the authority of the
government and its limits, that government is the creature of the constitution and cannot
do what it does not authorize. ... A priori, such a constitution could have only a fixed
and unchanging meaning, it if were to fulfill its function." PHILI KURLAND, WATERGATE
AND THE CONSTUTION 7 (1978).
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he wrote, "is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction ... not
dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same
yesterday, to-day, and forever.""'  This is vastly to be preferred to
"decisions [that] are a product of the ideology of the Justices, ... [t]he
outcome [being] all a matter of who is on the Court, what they believe,
and how they are influenced by current events."''
The present "conservative" Court fills Chemerinsky with gloomy
forebodings about our future,U overlooking that shifting political
alignments lead to a changing of the guard. For many jurisprudes, Earl
Warren was something less than divinely inspired, and the name of the
game is that "Two Can Play." Although I am a political "liberal," I pray
that the Court will look more closely to the Constitution than did Warren,
Brennan, et al., who remodeled the Constitution in tune with
Chemerinsky's desires.'
II. DAVID A. . RIcHARDs
Richards' paean to radical, abolitionist, antebellum theory builds on
a number of untenable assumptions-for example, "[flights-based political
theory gave a natural and plausible substantive basis for [the legitimacy
of the Constitution]" 26 and "the Civil War was justified ... to protect
human rights.' ' 27 Without pausing to catalog other, similar propositions,
let us consider these.
A. Rights-Based Theory
The "legitimacy" of the Constitution rests on its ratification and
adoption by the people, acting through their States, whereby they
consented to be governed by its terms.' It will not do to read back
m 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARiEs ON THE CONsTrUTION OF THE UNIIED STATES
§ 426, at 326 (5th ed. 1905).
.. Chmerinsky, supra note 4, at 1155.
Id. at 1156-57. Justice Black dismissed "Aiapsodical strains, about the duty of the
Court to keep the Constitution in time with the times." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
-' Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1153.
" Richards, supra note 5, at 1190.
'2 Id. at 1199.
12 The Declaration of Independence states that governments derive their powers
"fim the consent of the governed." TEE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776). We do well to remember what Justice Iredell, one of the ablest of the Founders,
averredL 'The people have chosen to be governed under such and such principles. They
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into the minds of the Founders our current preoccupationi" with
individual rights, for they were concerned with the rights of the commu-
nity rather than the individual. For them, "individual rights, even the
basic civil liberties that we consider so crucial, possessed little of their
modem theoretical relevance when set against the will of the people.""
"In the Convention and later," wrote Alpheus Thomas Mason, "states
rights-not individual rights-were the real worry." ' The Founders were
concerned with erecting a structure of government that would diffuse and
limit delegated' power, not with fortifying individual rights. "It was
conceivable," wrote Gordon Wood, "to protect the common law liberties
of the people against their rulers, but hardly against the people them-
selves."'" In the unamended Constitution the word "rights" appears but
once, in the Article I, Section 8 provision respecting inventions and
copyrights. The subsequent Bill of Rights largely responded to British
excesses-free speech, no quartering of soldiers, no unreasonable searches
and seizures, a right to bear arms, and sundry procedural requirements to
insure fair criminal proceedings. Individual rights were peculiarly the
concern of the States, as Judge Edmund Pendleton underscored in the
Virginia Ratification Convention: "[O]ur dearest rights-life, liberty and
property, as Virginians are still in the hands of our state legislatures.'
' 3
have not chosen to be governed, or promised to submit upon any other." 2 G.J. MCREE,
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857-58).
19 "We should be imposing upon the past a creature of our own imagining ... We
must learn, not from modem theorists, but from contemporaries of the events we are
studying .. " H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles, Parliaments and Great Councils in
Medieval England-I, 77 L.Q. REv. 213, 224 (1961).
130 GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN RErULC 1776-1787, 63
(1969). For citations to Leonard Levy, Wilmore Kendall, George Carey and Donald Lutz
for similar expressions, see James McClellan, The New Liberty of Contract Under the
Thirteenth Amendment: The Case Against McCrary v. Runyon, 3 BENCHMARK 279, 313,
314, 319 (1987). Nagel adverts to "a widespread pattern that inverts the priorities of the
framers: an obsessive concern for using the Constitution to protect individuals' rights:'
Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81, 82 (1981). 'Ilhe Framers' political theory was
immediately concerned with organization, not individuals ... with principles of power
allocation." Id. at 88. See also ZECHARIAL CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TE
CONSTrIUTION OF 1787, 90 (1956) ("The original Constitution did very little to protect
human rights against the States, and the Bill of Rights of 1791 restricted only the national
government.').
..1 ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFERALISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION 75 (1964).
12 WOOD, supra note 130, at 63.
3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSITUTION 301 (1836). John Bingham, draftsman of the Fourteenth
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Activists habitually overlook or downgrade the attachment of both the
Framers of 1787 and those of 1866 to state autonomy."
The Civil War, Richards asserts, was "justified ... to protect human
rights and to forge constitutional forms more adequate to this ultimate
moral vision of legitimate government."' 35 If by this is meant "justi-
fied" by the antislavery forces, they stood alone. In his essay on Abraham
Lincoln, James Russell Lowell noted that the war was not "avowedly for
the extinction of slavery, but a war rather for the preservation of our
national power and greatness, in which the emancipation of the negro has
been forced upon us by circumstances and accepted as a necessity."'"
Lincoln was no doctrinaire; in his Cooper Union Address on February 27,
1860, he stated: "Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let
it alone where it is, because that is due to the necessity arising from its
actual presence in the nation." 37 And in his First Inaugural Address on
March 4, 1861, Lincoln declared: "I have no purpose, directly or
indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where
it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no
inclination to do so."M When a delegation of Negro leaders called upon
him at the White House, he told them:
There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be,
for you free colored people to remain with us .... [E]ven when you
Amendment, stated: "Tlhe care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen...
is in the States, and not in the Federal Government. I have sought to effect no change in
that respect" AVINS, supra note 6, at 187.
L' See sw.'ra note 99 and accompanying text; see inffra notes 194-96 and
accompanying text.
13
' Richards, supra note 5, at 1199. Samuel Eliot Morison recounts that Francis
Parkman, the historian who was close to Northern sentiment, stated: "'I would see every
slave knocked on the head before I would see the Union go to pieces, and would include
in the sacrifice as many abolitionists as could conveniently be brought together.' That was
pretty much Lincoln's feeling too." SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 605 (1965).
M JAMES R. LOWELL, Abraham Lincoln Democracy, in 28 HARVARD CLASSICS:
ESSAYS ENGLISH AND AMERICAN 441, 455 (Charles W. Eliot ed., 1910).
" Cooper Union Address (Feb. 27,1860) in 9 ANNALS OF AMERICA 158, 169 (1968).
Alfred Kazin observed that Lincoln was "unwilling to alienate a public opinion that
everywhere inthe North was implacably, savagely opposed to giving slaves and even free
blacks any fredom of movement or civic rights." Alfred Kazin,,A Forever Amazing
Writer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1989, § 7, at 3 (book review).
' Abraham Lincoln's First Inaugural Address (March 4,1861) in 1 CARL SANDBURG,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: TM WAR YEARS 125 (1939). The Republican platform was to the
same effect. Id
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cease to be slaves, you are far removed from being placed on an
equality with the white race... I cannot alter it if I would. It is a
fact.
139
Nor did the Reconstruction Amendments spring from the abolitionists'
moral vision. The Fourteenth Amendment was triggered by the Black
Codes whereby the South sought in the aftermath of the Thirteenth
Amendment "to make slaves of men whom we have made free."'4 The
North had not fought a bloody war only to deliver the freed men to the
mercies of the South.
Richards maintains, however, "that the Reconstruction Amendments
were an outgrowth .... [of abolitionist theorizing] of the antebellum
period.' ' 41 He notes that such theorizing "can be divided into at least
three antagonistic schools of thought-radical disunionism, moderate anti-
slavery and radical anti-slavery-" '42 but no historian as yet has
identified "the one among them that crucially shaped the terms of the
Reconstruction Amendments." 43 It cannot therefore be assumed that
any one of the three schools influenced the framers. To fill the gap, he
proposes to proceed by "meta-interpretive questions about constitutional
interpretation."'" Instead of a "meta" inquiry, for lawyers are not
metaphysicians, let us proceed in lawyerly fashion.
Richards' "meta" inquiry leads him to prefer the "radical anti-slavery"
school led by Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany,'45 of whom Robert
13 C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BuRDEN OF SourHRN HISTORY 81 (1960). For a
while there was a movement to colonize the blacks elsewhere.
'- AVINS, supra note 6, at 138 (quoting Senator Henry Wilson); see also RAOUL
BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 23-24 (1989).
141 Richards, supra note 5, at 1187.
142 Id.
'43 Id. Malcolm Cowley, an acute critic, believed that, "obscurity was merely a cloak
for slipshod thinking." HANS BAR, MALCOLM COWLEY: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 194
(1993).
'44 Richards, supra note 5, at 1188. William James considered that Agassiz's "genius
lay not in abstract reasoning, which he despised, but in a comprehensive massing and
organization of facts." 1 RALPH BARTON PERRY, THE THOUGHT AND CHARACTER OF
WILLIAM JAMES 209 (1935). Augustine Birell observed that "[t]he historian who loads
his frail craft with that perilous and shifting freight, philosophy, adds immensely to the
dangers of his voyage across the ocean of Time." AUGUSTINE BmRELL, RES JUDICATAE
82 (1892). Max Born, the noted physicist, regarded as an "important discovery" that
"words mean nothing unless applied in a definite system of ideas for a definite problem
where they can be made significant for that problem." MAX BORN, MY LIFE: RECOLLEC-
TIONS OF A NOBEL LAUREATE 53 (1975).
145 Richards, supra note 5, at 1193, 1196.
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Cover, himself an activist said they were a "handful of relatively
unimportant antislavery thinkers."' Even so, their merit may commend
them. But faith in their constitutional analysis is speedily vitiated by
Tiffany's insistence that "slavery was unconstitutional."147 Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution distinguishes between "free
Persons" and "other Persons";.. Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 protects
the "Migration or Importation!' of such "persons";149 and Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 3 refers to "Person[s] held to Service or
Labour""--the Framers sedulously avoided the word "slave....
Lincoln justly considered that the Constitution protected slavery in the
States that had it. How then did the "radical anti-slavery" theorists
interpret the Constitution "to forbid slavery?" Lysander Spooner, "the
most theoretically profound advocate of this position,"'53 advocated that
the above-quoted provisions "were to be interpreted not to recognize
slavery on the theory that any interpretation should be accorded the
words, no matter how textually strained, that did not recognize slav-
ery."'" He denied "any weight to the constitutional text or history in
conflict with the claims of rights-based political theory."55 "[H]istory
was to be disowned altogether."'" To call this "interpretation" is to do
violence to the word."s With such unbounded "interpretive" freedom,
'6 ROBERT M. CovER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
155 (1975).
147 M. K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOuRTEENTH AmENDMENT AND
THE BILL OP RIGHTS 42 (1986).
'4' "[S]hall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons ... three
fifths of all other Persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 3 (amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2).
149 "The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cL 1.
"' "No person held to Service or Labor in one State... U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl 3.
' The framers of the Articles of Confederation "had been ashamed to use the terms
'Slaves'." 1 MAx FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787, 561
(1911).
' In his debates with Douglas, Lincoln said, "[W]e have no right to disturb slavery
in the States where it exists." H. M. HYNDMAN, FURTHER REMINISCENCES 334 (1912).
'n Richards, supra note 5, at 1193.
15 Id. (emphasis added).
155 Id.
1 Id. (emphasis added).
" Huxley stated that "the end cannot justify the means, for the simple and obvious
reason that the means employed determine the nature of the ends produced." ALDOUS
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one could prove that the moon is made of green cheese. That such
theorizing should commend itself to Richards as the product of a
"profound advocate" indicates his conviction that the result is the thing,
rather than the means.
B. Abolitionist Influence
The Reconstruction Amendments, Richards maintains, "were an
outgrowth of the abolitionist political and constitutional theory of the
antebellum period."'58 For this he avouches an array of commentators,
of whom more anon, rather than historical facts. 59 The Spooner-Tiffany
theorizing should make us skeptical about their impact on the Framers.
Among the first to discover the charms of abolitionist theology was
Howard Jay Graham; he described it as "inchoate,"'" "rankly, frankly
heretical'' and "extremely heterodox."'" That the hard-headed
lawyers who sat in the thirty-ninth Congress would discard their orthodox
views for such heresies requires a great leap of the imagination.
The fact is that abolitionist speeches during the drive to abolish
slavery did not reflect postwar sentiment in the North. Racism, as we
have seen, "ran deep in the North,"'" and as Henry Monaghan noted,
many Americans "opposed slavery and racial equality with equal
intensity,"'" as may be gleaned from Lincoln's remarks. 6 Then too,
HUXLEY, ENDS AND MEANS 10 (1937).
The '"means whereby we try to achieve something are at least as important as
the end we wish to attain. Indeed, they are even more important. For the means
employed inevitably determine the nature of the result achieved, whereas,
however good the end aimed at may be, its goodness is powerless to counteract
the effect of the bad means we use to reach it."
Id. at 59-60. "In rallying to the French Army Captain [Alfred Dreyhus], Zola was fighting
for a principle ... 'that in a decent, democratic society, good ends cannot be used to
excuse bad means, if only because it is those who employ the means who decide which
ends are good."' Alden Whitman, Books: The Zola Muni Didn't Play, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 1977, at C23 (book review).
" Richards, supra note 5, at 1187.
159 For a marshalling of the facts, see BERGER, supra note 51, at 230-45, and RAOUL
BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BiLL OF RIGHTS 55-67 (1989).
1- GRAHAM, supra note 52, at 543.
1 Id. at 242.
162 Id. at 237.
"' See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
' Henry P. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 117, 126 (1978).
" See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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abolitionist campaigning had aroused hostility;, long afterwards the aged
Justice Holmes, a Civil War veteran, wrote that he had come "to loathe
... the Abolitionists conviction that anyone who did not agree with them
was a knave or a fool."'" During the war years, wrote C. Vann
Woodward, ."[t]he great majority of citizens in the North still abhorred
any association with abolitionists."'" Senator William Fessenden,
chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, held the "extreme
radicals" in "abhorrence."'" Senator Edmund Cowan ridiculed the
notion that the "antipathy that never sleeps, that never dies, that is inborn,
down at the very foundation of our natures"'69 was to "be swept away
by half a dozen debates and the reading of half a dozen reports from
certain abolition societies.'
'170
The radical abolitionist leaders in Congress were detested. Thaddeus
Stevens, the "Scourge of the South" was openly hated by many Radical
Republicans. 7' In the Joint Committee, his measures "were more voted
against than voted for."'" His Senate counterpart, Charles Sumner, was
"distrusted" when not "detested."'7 Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, scathingly commented in 1870: "It
has been over the idiosyncracies, over the unreasonable propositions of
... [Sumner] that freedom has been proclaimed and established."'7
In truth, a Republican conservative-moderate coalition, as Michael L.
Benedict has shown, "enacted their program with the sullen acquiescence
16 2 HOuAEs-LAsKI LE"TERS: THE CORREsPONDENCE OF MR. JUSICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASKI 1291 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953).
'67 WOODWARD, supra note 59, at 73.
1 KENDRICK, supra note 32, at 257.
' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866).
'7 Id. It is difficult for our generation to appreciate the feelings of the men of 1866.
William R. Brock wrote: "A belief in racial equality was an abolitionist invention," "to
the great majority of men in the mid-19th century it seemed to be condemned both by
experience and by science.' WILIAM R. BROCK, AN AMEmcAN CRISis: CONGRESS AND
RECONSTRUCION 285, 286 (1963). Consider the reaction of the generous-hearted
Thackeray on his first visit to the United States and sight of blacks in 1853: "Sambo is
not my man & my brother, the very aspect of his face is grotesque & inferior I can't help
seeing & owning this; at the same time of course denying any white maen's right to hold
his fellow-creature in bondage." GORDON N. RAY, THACKERAY: THE AGE OF WISDOM
1847-1863, 216 (1958).
171 FAWN M. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SouTH 258-59 (1959).
'72 Id. at 268.
17 DONALD, supra note 60, at 248.
174 MICHAEL L. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 39 (1974).
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of some radicals and over the open opposition of many."" Benedict's
study is confirmed by the defeat 125-12 in the House17 and 34-4 in the
Senate"7  of radical insistence that Tennessee provide for black
suffrage'78-considered by Sumner to be the only adequate guarantee for
protection of blacks 79-as a condition for readmission to the Union. It
is such votes, not what abolitionists had said outside Congress in the
prewar years, that illuminate the intention of the framers.
Richards takes no notice of the foregoing facts, but relies on a two-
inch array of "authorities." 8' Take Michael Kent Curtis, a small-town
practitioner until activists elevated him into an "authority;" my critique
of his book, wrote Forrest McDonald, is utterly "devastating."181 His
thesis that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights runs
counter to the views of such renowned scholars as Charles Fairman,'"
Louis Henki, 183 Judge Henry Friendly,184 Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold, 85 and the Supreme Court itself1 8 Sir Herbert Butterfield,
an eminent historiographer, wrote that a scholar must take account of
discrepant evidence; s but Richards does not as much as say "But see."
Similarly, my refutation of William Nelson's views about the impact of
'is Id. at 210; see also DONALD, supra note 60, at 51-52, 61. Senator John Sherman
told a Cincinnati audience in September, 1866, during the ratification campaign: "They
talk about radicals; why we defeated every radical proposition in it." JOSEPH B. JAMES,
THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 167 (1965).
176 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3980 (1866).
17 Id. at 4000.
"9 Id. at 3980, 4000.
"9 Id. at 685.
11o Richards, supra note 5, at 1187 nl.
... Forrest McDonald, How the Fourteenth Amendment Repealed the Constitution,
CHRONICLES, 29, 31 (Oct. 1989).
" Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of ights?,
2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
" Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE
L.J. 74 (1963).
'" Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Pdghts as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL.
L. REV. 929 (1965).
.. Erwin N. Griswold, Due Process Problems Today in the United States, in THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 161, 164 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
" In 1959 Justice Frankfirter stated on behalf of the Court: "The relevant historical
materials .... demonstrate conclusively that Congress ... did not contemplate that the
Fourteenth Amendment was a short-hand incorporation of the first eight amendments
making them applicable as explicit restrictions upon the States." Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
19 HERBERT BurrERFELD, GEORGE I1 AND THE HISTORIANS 225 (1969).
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abolitionism on the Fourteenth Amendmentss goes unmentioned.
Richards cites no less than four of Robert Kaczorowski's publications;
although an activist sympathizer, Michael Zuckert, opines that
"Kaczorowski's version of context does not easily cohere with much of
the evidence he himself presents."'" I should have serious doubts about
the judgment of one who undertakes to assay the Fourteenth Amendment
and, according to Zuckert, "neglects altogether the congressional debates
on the amendment"'" This is to stage Hamlet without the Dane. Then
there is the citation to Harold Hyman. Hyman, however, wrote that
"Negrophobia tended to hold even the sparse Reconstruction institutions
that the nation created to low throttle"'' and that "[a] heavy phalanx
of Republican politicos ... were states rights nationalists, suspicious of
any new functional path the nation travelled." Hyman also noted
Republican unwillingness "to travel then any road more rugged than...
[the] route that left the states masters of their fates." '93 These are views
I elaborated. Patently Richards collects authorities without weighing their
arguments.
Because Northern attachment to states rights goes unnoticed by
activists, a few words may be in order."9 Horace Flack stated in a
pioneer study that "[t]he Radical leaders were as aware as any one of the
attachment of a great majority of the people to the doctrine of States
it Raoul Berger, Fantasiing 4bout the Fourteenth Amendment: A Review Essay,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1043. Compare Justice Stevens remarks about another activist icon,
Jefferson Powell: 'There has, of course, been a lively scholarly debate about Powell's
view. See 'Original Intention' in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296
(1986) for example, Raoul Berger, ... (challenging Powell's claim)." John Paul Stevens,
The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CmI. L. REV. 13, 36 n.77 (1992).
189 Michael Zuckert, Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 149, 154 (1991)
(reviewing ROBERT J. KACzOROwsKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JusncE AND CIVIL RiGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985)).
L Id. at 153.
191 HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR
AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSITTION 447 (1973).
Alfred Kelly wrote of "the limitation imposed by the essentially federal character of
the American constitutional system, which at last made it impossible to set up a
comprehensive and unlimited program for the integration of the negro into the southern
social order." Alfred H. Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in NEW
FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 55 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1966)
(emphasis added).
HYMAN, supra note 191, at 304.
m Id. at 470.
'4 For extended discussion, see BERGER, supra note 51, at 54-64.
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rights."195 Let one illustration suffice: at the outset, Roscoe Conkling,
a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated: "Mhe
proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any
class of persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches
upon the principle of existing local sovereignty."'96 This it was, along
with racism, that made constitutional remediation so "sparse." Activists'
neglect of such factors, their reliance rather on icons of their own creation
demonstrates Paul Brest's charge that they are engaged in "advocacy
scholarship," "amicus briefs" for their own predilections.1"
C. Brown v. Board of Education
Richards cites my Government by Judiciary as "a notable example of
an approach under which Brown is wrongly decided." '98 It is "notable"
only because Brown has become an off-limits sacred cow. Judge Richard
Posner observed that "[n]o Constitutional theory that implies that Brown
... was decided incorrectly will receive a fair hearing nowadays, though
on a consistent application of originalism it was decided incorrectly."''
My studies constrained me to conclude that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment meant to leave segregation untouched,2 °' and that view has
won pretty wide acceptance."' Hence, Chief Justice Warren's summary
dismissal of the legislative history as "inconclusive" 2' is simply wrong.
Richards, however, rejects a "simplistic tracking of a prior concrete
historical understanding-indeed, on such a view Plessy would be right
and Brown wrong."2 3 What is "simplistic!' about honoring the "concrete
"'HORACE FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH ArmNmENT 68 (1908).
196 AVINS, supra note 6, at 111; see supra note 191.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
19 Richards, supra note 5, at 1188.
Richard Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1990)
(emphasis added).
2 BERG ER, supra note 51, at 117-33.
201 See Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of Bork, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 993, 1014 &
n.180 (1991).
' Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). It had not seemed
inconclusive to Vinson, Frankfiurter, Jackson, Clark, and, probably, Reed. RICHARD
KLUGER, SnaMLE JUSTICE 590, 598, 688-89, 682, 595-96, 680-92 (1976).
20 Richards, supra note 5, at 1188. Aneminent historiographer, Peter Gay, considered
one who approaches "empirical data... by way of a preconceived theoretical bias" is "a
poor historian." 1 HISTORIANS AT WORK 271 (Peter Gay & Gerald J. Cavanaugh eds.,
1972). Augustine Birrell, noted English writer and statesman, adverted to the "danger of
being philosophy-ridden, and of losing our love for facts simply as facts." AUGUSTINE
BImRELL, OBITER DICTA, 21) SERIES 189 (1899), and noted that Burke was "a ferocious
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historical understanding," the framers' own explanation of their aims? For
six hundred years of Anglo-American history the search for the original
intention has been a tenet of the common law.2° Richards, however,
prefers his "enriched understanding of our interpretive responsibilities to
trivializ[ing] our interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments [by]
some fictive search for the concrete exemplars." '2 5  It is not an
"interpretive responsibilit[y]" to repudiate the "concrete historical
understanding." And my own four-year "search" was "real," not "fictive";
it found such assurances as that of James Wilson who, explaining "civil
rights and immunities," stated that they did not mean that all "children
shall attend the same schools."2'
Why do originalists attach so much importance to the "concrete
historical understanding"? John Selden, a seventeenth century sage, stated:
"[A] Man's Writing has but one true [Sense], which is that which the
Author meant when he writ it"2 7 The alternative, preferred by activists,
is the reader's explanation of what the writer intended rather than that of
the writer himself. An activist icon, Jefferson Powell, wrote that "[t]he
[Republican] victors viewed the 'revolution of 1800' as the people's
endorsement'2 °8 of "a search for the Constitution's underlying and
original 'intent."'": Little wonder that Chief Justice Marshall considered
"intention" to be the "most sacred rule of interpretation. ' 210 It was the
rule advocated by the arch-radical Senator Charles Sumner in the debates
of the Reconstruction Congress and expressed in unmistakable terms
by the Senate Judiciary Committee in a unanimous Report signed by
Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in Congress:
hater of abstractions and metaphysical politics." Onrrs DICrA, 2D SERIES 190 (1901).
2
" See, e.g., Raoul Berger , "Original Intention" in Hiorical Perspective, 54 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Raoul Berger, The Foufders' Views-According to Jefferson
Powell, 67 TEX L. REV. 1033, 1059-76 (1989).
' Richards, supra note 5, at 1201. For the product of a real, not fictive, search, see
supra note 6.
2w AVINS, supra note 6, at 163.
2" JoHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK: BENG THE DIscouRsEs OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 10
(2d ed. 1696).
H. Jefferson Powel, The Oriinal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 934 (1985).
Id. at 927.
no JOHN MARsHALL's DEFENsE OF McCULLocH v. MRYL4ND 167 (Gerald Gunther
ed., 1969).
, "Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their
minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt ... we cannot err if we turn to the
framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence which they have left
on the question' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
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In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such
interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be
accomplished by those who framed it and the people who adopted it.
.... A construction which should give the phrase ... a meaning
differing from the sense in which it was understood and employed by
the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitu-
tional as a departure from the plain and express language of the
Constitution in any other particular. This is the rule of interpretation
adopted by all commentators on the Constitution, and in all judicial
expositions of that instrument....?
Notwithstanding the foregoing facts, Richards maintains that, "[i]n
light of the text and background of the Reconstruction Amendments, it
would be, a fortiori, illegitimate today ... [to] appeal to the concrete
intentions of the founders."" What "background of the Reconstruction
Amendments" stands higher than the framers' admonition to respect their
"concrete intentions"? Richards also insists that Brown "was interpretively
correct" 4 on the basis of "the meaning of human rights in contempo-
rary circumstances."2 "5 He has proved himself a worthy disciple of
Lysander Spooner, adopting the counsel that "any interpretation should
be accorded the words, no matter how strained" to achieve the desired
goal.216 But let us have no more mumbo-jumbo about "interpretive
responsibility,' and let him candidly acknowledge his desire to have the
judiciary rewrite the Constitution in line with his desires.
It is an historical axiom that we should not [impose] upon the past a
creature of our own imagining."1 7 This is the more important when the
people in "the past" formally adopted a document upon the basis of
212 AVINS, supra note 6, at 571.
213 Richards, supra note 5, at 1202. On the other hand, Charles Black, discussing the
meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" during the impeachment investigation of
President Richard Nixon, noted some remarks of the Framers and stated: "[Tihe men
present were representative of their time, and their understanding, at the moment when
the crucial language was under closest examination, tells us a great deal about its
meaning." CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHmENT: A HANDBOOK 28-29 (1974).
214 Richards, supra note 5, at 1203.
"5 Id. at 1203 (emphasis added). Richards substitutes wishful thinking for unpalatable
facts. "'I don't think America was ready to end segregation;' . . . 'I don't think it has ever
been ready to extend fall equality,"' said Mr. Benjamin L. Hooks, executive director of
the N.A.A.C.P. Peter Applebome, Rights Movement in Struggle for an Image as Well as
a Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1991, at Al, A18 (book review).
26 Richards, supra note 5, at 1193.
217 Richardson & Sayles, supra note 129, at 224.
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representations made to them. Repudiation of such representations, said
Justice Story, is a "fraud" upon the people.21 If "contemporary
circumstances" call for change, the means are amendment under Article
V, not revision of the Constitution by the judiciary. It is not for judges,
noted Marshall, to "change" the instrument.
29
CONCLUSION
Time was when activists extolled the Court as "keeper of the national
conscience." '  With the changing of the guard, it appears that it was
the activists' own conscience that they cherished, not that of the nation.
It needs no more than the invective of Dean Guido Calabresi of Yale to
make the point: "I despise the current Supreme Court and find its
aggressive, willful statist behavior disgusting." '  Compare with this
Anthony Lewis' panegyric: "The 15 years since [Warren] became Chief
Justice have been years of legal revolution. In that time the Supreme
Court has brought about more social change than most Congresses and
most Presidents." The reason, Lewis explains, is that "there were
outrages in American life... no other arm of the government was doing
anything about them." Congress' inaction, however, does not transfer
legislative power to the Court. If such inaction be "mischievous," to
borrow from Justice Story,
the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by an exercise of
the power of amendment. If they do not choose to apply the remedy, it
may fairly be presumed, that the mischief is less than what would arise
from a further extension of the power, or that it is the least of two
evils. 4
2," "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated on all
sides, that such protection was afforded, would it not be a fraud upon the whole people
to give a different construction to its powers?" STORY, supra note 122, § 1084, at 33.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
,,0 Anthony Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER EARL WARREN 151 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972); see also A.S. Miller & R.F.
Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661,
689 (1960).
Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, § 4,
at 15.
= Anthony Lewis, A Man Born to Act, Not to Muse, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
EARL WARREN 151 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972); see also BERGER, supra note 51, at 283
n.l.
"3 LEWIS, supra note 220, at 159.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSITIUHON OF THE UNITED STATES
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
By way of a parting word, let me remind Professor Chemerinsky that
"[a] social scientist who permits political or social sympathies tominimize indications tending toward unwelcome conclusions impairs the
integrity of his science" and damages confidence in his
judgmentY 6 For Professor Richards' philosophizing, let me commend
the words of Francis Bacon:
As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary
commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little
light because they are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to
the states where they live, what is received law and not what ought to
be the law.Y
7
An activist more candid than most, Thomas Grey, considers the
question whether the Court may "enforce principles of liberty and justice
... [when they are] ... not to be found within the four corners"M  of
the Constitution as "perhaps the most fundamental question we can ask
about our fundamental law." For me it is the most fundamental
question, because any judicial arrogation of undelegated power invades
the right of the people to control their own destiny.'
§ 426, at 325 (5th ed. 1905).
m Archer E. Sutherland, All Sides of the Question: Felix Franlgurter and Personal
Freedom, in 2 FELIX FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 109, 112 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
' Learned Hand stated:
You cannot raise the standard against oppression, or leap into the breach to
relieve injustice, and still keep an open mind to every disconcerting fact, or an
open ear to the cold voice of doubt. I am satisfied that a scholar who tries to
combine these parts sells his birthright for a mess of pottage.
LEARNED HAND, THE SpIrr oF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND
138 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
221EPHRAIM LONDON, THE WORLD Op LAw: THE LAw IN LITERATURE xvi (1960).
m Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975).2 Id.
°The Court "has demanded a number of changes which do not command
majoritarian support." LOis LUsKy, BY WHAT RIGHT? 277 (1975).
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